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MACIEJ WĄS * 
“THERE IS AN ‘IS’”: INTUITION OF BEING 
IN THE THOUGHT AND WRITINGS 
OF GILBERT KEITH CHESTERTON 
(A MARITAINIAN PERSPECTIVE) 
The speculative value of Gilbert Keith Chesterton’s literary heritage does 
not cease to provoke controversy, or even confusion among specialists in the 
field, with the judgments varying from straightforward affirmation to spiteful 
mockeries. The purpose of this text is to contribute to the question, if only 
a little, and to provide a certain path to understanding Chesterton’s writing 
themselves as well as (in a sense at least) the controversy they cause by 
demonstrating that their metaphysical potential rests upon metaphysical intui-
tion of being, and metaphysical intuition of being only. 
The inquiry shall open with very brief considerations about metaphysical 
intuition of being as such, pointing to certain essential traits due to which its 
presence might be identified, which are going to be followed by a short in-
terpretative procedure aimed at localizing these traits in Chesterton’s writ-
ings, and end with a handful of conclusions about the possible benefits re-
sulting from this sort of inquiry. The basis for considering metaphysical intu-
ition of being is going to be found in the books penned by an unmatchable 
expert in the field, a French Thomist Jacques Maritain (most notably A Pref-
ace to Metaphysics and Existence and the Existent), whereas in the case of 
Chesterton’s heritage — chiefly in Orthodoxy and The Everlasting Man, and 
— of course — Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
First things first, then; let us consider metaphysical intuition of being 
as such. 
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What is intuition? Słownik-przewodnik filozoficzny (The Philosophical 
Dictionary-Guide), edited and published by Polish Thomas Aquinas’ Associ-
ation, defines it as “non-discursive, penetrating vision, introductory in rela-
tion to further knowledge (reasoning) or crowning it.”1 According to this 
definition then, intuition of being should at least constitute a direct, deep and 
penetrating perception, in a flash of which human mind grasps being precise-
ly qua being, abstracted from any possible content and exigencies of more 
particularized objects; and indeed, it is precisely this. Intuition of being, as 
Maritain writes in Existence and the Existent (1947), grants the thinking sub-
ject an access to being that is not “the vague being of common sense, nor the 
particularized being of the sciences and of the philosophy of nature, nor the 
de-realized being of logic, nor the pseudo-being of dialectics mistaken for 
philosophy. It is being disengaged for its own sake.” (MARITAIN 2015, 16). 
What does it mean precisely, however? What is this “being disengaged for its 
own sake”? Probably the fullest answer to that question can be found in an 
earlier book by Maritain, one called in English A Preface to Metaphysics 
(1934). In this work, Maritain explains that what this intuition enables the 
subject to grasp the object (being qua being) itself (MARITAIN 1943, 63), 
alongside with “certain exigencies and certain laws” that being itself implies 
(ibid., 92), with the most important of these being, of course, the first princi-
ples, of which the French philosopher names four: “identity, sufficient rea-
son, finality and causality” (ibid., 91) (thus also, in a different place, Mari-
tain writes about “the intuition of being and first principles, [cursive mine — 
M.W.]” (MARITAIN 1931, 126) clearly indicating that the intuitive preception 
of the latter is just an unfolding or, in a sense, revelation of the “diversity 
and riches contained in the primary intuition of being as such” (MARITAIN 
1943, 75)). 
So far so good; however, there is another problem. For how to verify if 
Gilbert Keith Chesterton had this intuition (as we maintain) or not? Jacques 
Maritain himself thought it possible to assert, at least in certain cases (like 
for example in the case of the unfortunate Immanuel Kant2), its presence or 
absence in the mind of the other, so such a procedure seems to be at least not 
impossible in itself. How? The French maitre, clarifying the matter in A 
Preface to Metaphysics, writes that the intuition of being as such, the au-
thentic and “intensive” perception of this object, involves two “lights,” one 
                        
1 S.v. “intuicja”: “ogląd niedyskursywny, dogłębny, wstępny w stosunku do dalszego poznania 
(rozumowania) lub zwieńczający je.” 
2 MARITAIN 1943, 48: “Kant never had it.” Simple and communicative. 
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on the side of the knowing subject, the other on the side of the object itself. 
This subjective “light” is simply a habitus, “internal virtue of knowledge and 
judgment in the intellect” (as Maritain defines it in another book (MARITAIN 
1944, 69)) by the means of which “the intellect is proportioned to a given 
object” (MARITAIN 1943, 45), or — in other words — can “deal” with the ob-
ject in question, can examine it effectively, learn the truth about it and — fi-
nally — explain it, present it to others in a form most suited to its essential 
exigencies. Objective “light” is what Maritain calls the “ratio formalis sub 
qua,” rendering an object present in the intellect and knowable for it, a 
means by which a given aspect of reality itself enters the spiritual life of 
man and becomes unified with it (ibid.). Objective light, “prior in the onto-
logical rank,” is here the principle and the cause, habitus — only a “reac-
tion,” so to speak, a “recipient” (ibid.); or, in other words, object plays the 
role of the formal cause, human mind — material one (MARITAIN 2011, 124–
125).3 Now, taking this into consideration, is it not possible that this higher 
and constitutive light could thus manifest itself separately from the lower 
light it effectuates, not in the order of existence of course — but in the order 
of operation? It certainly does not seem im-possible. “What then is time? If 
no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know 
not,” says St. Augustine4; and if the almost infinite supremity of the form in 
relation to matter (GILSON 2015, 196)5 is taken into account, this historical 
testimony — great as it is — becomes even more profound. It is quite possi-
ble to understand an object, even profoundly to understand it, without pos-
sessing the science of it, and without being able to speak of it in a special-
ized manner. And this is precisely what this work is going to focus on; the 
aim is not to find in Chesterton any metaphysical language, but — let us re-
peat that, for it is important — metaphysical understanding. 
First things first, then, and as to the object itself; to the perception of be-
ing as being in its intelligible purity. Did Chesterton know know it for what 
it is — and did he express this knowledge in some manner? Is it possible to 
find it in his writings? 
                        
3 Of course, Maritain takes great caution to underline the fact that species does not “inform” or 
“determines” the mind “as form determines a matter or a subject,” yet still the question of “inform-
ing” (and thus matter-form relationship) remains, rendering the analogy applied here quite justified. 
4 AUGUSTINE, Confessions, book IX. 
5 Gilson goes as far as to proclaim that although it is matter that serves as the principle of 
individuation, the form (concretely — the soul, for the chapter is dedicated to the Christian con-
cept of man) is the proper “cause of individuality.” Essential superiority of formal order to 
material order could not be asserted with greater might. 
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Obviously, never explicite; however, as it was said, we are not looking for 
explicit formulations and professional analyzes, but with the signs of under-
standing the subject in question. What is the nature of this subject, then? To 
phrase it as briefly as possible, in the light of the perennial philosophy, being 
is: essentially analogical, composed of two elements: essence and existence,6 
with existence serving here as the constitutive factor, an act, and essence — 
only potency.7 This is the proper “definition” of being. 
In relation to the first of these elements, the essence-existence relation, it 
is best to begin by examining an original passage, one contained in Chester-
ton’s probably most strictly philosophical book, St. Thomas Aquinas (1933), 
a treaty of an amateur that “awed Etienne Gilson himself” (WĄS 2016, 40) 
(which is, in the case of GKC, so characteristic). In this book, Chesterton, 
while describing the quarrel between different philosophical schools, writes: 
When a child looks out of the nursery window and sees anything, say the green 
lawn of the garden, what does he actually know; or does he know anything? […] 
St. Thomas Aquinas, suddenly intervening in this nursery quarrel, says emphati-
cally that the child is aware of Ens. Long before he knows that grass is grass, or 
self is self, he knows that something is something. Perhaps it would be best to 
say very emphatically (with a blow on the table), ‘There is an Is.’ That is as 
much monkish credulity as St. Thomas asks of us at the start. Very few unbeliev-
ers start by asking us to believe so little. And yet, upon this sharp pin-point of re-
ality, he rears by long logical processes that have never really been successfully 
overthrown, the whole cosmic system of Christendom. (CHESTERTON 2007, 81). 
Of course, this quote contains many different motives that could be here 
analyzed. Incidentally, for example, it implicitly states that being (“Ens”) is 
the ultimate and primary object of thought, connatural to the mind (MARITAIN 
1931, 109–110), coextensive with the whole field of knowledge, with other 
objects being but this very object “narrowed down” (so to speak) to a certain 
aspect (MARITAIN 1943, 25–26) (being “aware of Ens” means being aware that 
“something is something,” with this “something” distinguished from “grass” 
or — “self,” so from any kind of “particularized being,” whether material or 
                        
6 “”[I]n virtue of its essential structure the concept of being also includes in itself indissolubly 
— as every degree of its polyvalence, and whichever kind of being we are considering, through-
out its entire extent, the boundless field it can cover — these two linked and associated members 
of the pair essence-existence, which the mind cannot isolate in separate concepts.” MARITAIN 
1943, 65. 
7 “Made real by the act of existing — that is to say, placed outside the state of simple possi-
bility — [essences] are really distinct from it as potency is really distinct from the act that 
actuates it.” MARITAIN 2015, 26. 
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immaterial, known scientifically or only via the common sense; it is the usual 
literary method of Chesterton, consisting in — basically — communicating 
very elevated content through simple, trifle even, forms (WĄS 2016, 45)8; it is 
a fascinating subject, about which something will have to be said here later); 
incidentally, it seems to boarder on the brink of specialist Thomist distinction 
between ens ut existens and ens ut quid essentiale, being as existing, as exer-
cising its act of existing or at least capable of exercising it (being as a subject) 
and being as certain intelligible determination, a network of laws, exigencies, 
aspects, perceived by the intellect in a quidditative manner (albeit only ana-
logically) (MARITAIN 1943, 92–93). The most important element of this pas-
sage, however, lies somewhere else; and is so small, so trifle one even might 
say, that could be attributed to a mere accident or a slip of a tongue, if not for 
the profound meaning it conveys, much too elevated to be a result of chance. 
“There is an Is” — this sentence reveals all that is necessary. 
For we might wonder — why is it phrased like this? Why did Chesterton 
not stop at “something is something” (the simplest and clearest possible for-
mulation of the principle of identity, to which we shall pass in due time), but 
thought it necessary to make this addition, and — moreover — thought it 
necessary to render what he had in mind by using such an unusual lexical 
device, a verb transformed into a noun? Now, obviously nothing here is “cer-
tain” in the sense contemporary world seems to ascribe to this word most 
commonly (and which boarders on the brink of sheer impossibility), yet it 
seems only probable (or even more than probable) that such a procedure 
would never take place had Chesterton not needed a special mean of expres-
sion, corresponding, doubtless, to the mystery or depth of the reality he tried 
to describe. What is, in turn, the dominant “moment” of this mean? Indubi-
tably — the fact that it stresses activity and dynamism — and activity and 
dynamism that transcend, mind, the realm of a simple “something” men-
tioned just before (so being taken as subject), something undoubtedly con-
nected to it (for it is taken here as a part of the same logical structure) and 
yet different, at least in a sense, from it, something much more mysterious 
and elevated (the use of the capital letter also brings some elements into 
play). Now, does the Everlasting Philosophy distinguish such an element of 
reality, a part of that would fit this description? The answer is obvious 
enough; and it is clear almost beyond any doubt that what Chesterton con-
veys under this phrase is the act of existing purely and simply, an “act par 
excellence,” an act of all acts, that which is “most actual and most formal” in 
                        
8 Cf. also WILLIS 1961, 48. 
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all things (MARITAIN 2015, 26), different, infinitely different, of course, from 
all “secondary acts” committed by creatures in the order of action (MARITAIN 
1943, 111)9 (the capital letter, again, saying more than words10) — which all 
the more stresses the appropriateness of this Chestertonian solution; “it evi-
dently serves a metaphor,” the frequently cited unpublished paper states in 
its simple and brief manner, “expressing the basic Thomist idea that the act 
of being (‘Is’) is not identical with essence (‘something that is’)” (WĄS 
2016, 40). And obviously, for — as we have seen, Chesterton sees most 
clearly both aspects of the problem and expresses them, so to speak, at one 
blow; there is “a something” and there is “an Is” — and the two form, to-
gether, the basic object of the mind, connatural to it, the object par excel-
lence — being qua being, reality as reality; thus “something is something,” 
the Chestertonian formulation of the principle of identity, as if “doubles it-
self” (obviously only in logical implications, which is in itself a proof that 
thought transcends language), revealing its two-dimensional depth, at once 
“’essential’ or ‘copulative’ (‘every being is what it is’), but also and primari-
ly existential (‘that which exists, exists’)” (MARITAIN 2015, 35, endnote 13) 
which serves as a neat recapitulation and summary of the present delibera-
tions (not to mention that the use of “an Is” is simply a translation of the 
original Thomas’s esse (ŚWIEŻAWSKI 2002, 44–46) — which only demon-
strates the complexity of expression, the dense network of allusions Chester-
ton’s texts are wreathed in). 
By a fortunate twist of events, this whole analysis proves the second ef-
fect of the intuition of being listed above; for Chesterton, in his concise 
phrase, not only affirms that being has two inseparable aspects, essence and 
existence, but that existence takes precedence before essence, serves as its 
principle, form and supreme act, a certain “energy” vivifying and penetrating 
whole reality; it is just a logical implication of what has been said hitherto 
about the problem. Thus, while affirming the intrinsic analogy (proportional-
ity) of being, Chesterton affirms its existential character; “a thing can ‘be’ 
intelligible and yet not ‘be’ at all” (CHESTERTON 2007, 71) — it is rather clear 
which one of these senses is here supreme. 
                        
9 Maritain, it is useful to note, seems to contradict this thesis by placing actus secundus “over 
and above the simple fact of existing,” but obviously it is only an appearance, for the French 
philosopher explicitly uses here the word “fact of existence,” meaning the natural existence of 
things apprehended empirically — not existence in its transcendental richness. 
10 Cf. WĄS, 2016, 60–62 and the analysis of the weather-metaphor from What’s Wrong with 
the World (1910). 
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That is all that can be said, for now, about the object of the intuition of 
being as such; let us proceed to the first principles. The principle of identity, 
the most important of all first principles, to which other ones can be reduced 
(MARITAIN 1943, 101),11 has largely been covered in this text in the analysis 
of the passage from St. Thomas Aquinas. What is left to do then, in such a 
preliminary text, is to limit the analysis as much as possible, and proceed to 
examining two more of the first principles, the most essential besides this of 
identity — the principle of sufficient reason and of finality, as the Preface… 
lists them. 
Principle of sufficient reason consists in realizing, to formulate it as brief-
ly as possible, that being is not nonsensical, or — as Maritain phrases it — 
that being is “grounded in being,” that it has a real ontological structure, the 
sign of which is the fact that it satisfies the intellect, with being forming a 
hierarchy of interrelations culminating in the complete aseity of God, who is 
the supreme Reason of Himself, an infinite Intellection (transcending the du-
ality of the knower and the known) (ibid., 99–101). Sufficient reasons, being 
definitely real, necessarily point to the Ultimate Reason, which is the reason 
of them all individually and in toto; for the sake of brevity, we shall limit 
ourselves to this one key aspect. 
Can such an intellectual assertion be found in Chesterton’s writings? To 
establish that, I would propose a procedure that could be deemed as quite 
risky, yet — I think — worthy of a try. In Orthodoxy (1908), perhaps the 
most fundamental of all Chesterton’s book (one that sealed, so to speak, his 
intellectual crystallization (ODDIE 2010, 10)), we find a passage that runs as 
follows: 
All the towering materialism which dominates the modern mind rests ultimate-
ly upon one assumption; a false assumption. It is supposed that if a thing goes 
on repeating itself it is probably dead; a piece of clockwork. […] This is a fal-
lacy even in relation to known fact. For the variation in human affairs is gener-
ally brought into them, not by life, but by death; by the dying down or breaking 
off of their strength or desire. […] The sun rises every morning. I do not rise 
every morning; but the variation is due not to my activity, but to my inaction. 
Now, to put the matter in a popular phrase, it might be true that the sun rises 
regularly because he never gets tired of rising. His routine might be due, not to 
a lifelessness, but to a rush of life. The thing I mean can be seen, for instance, 
in children, when they find some game or joke that they specially enjoy. A 
child kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of life. Because 
                        
11 Albeit only negatively; Maritain proves, for example, the validity of the principle of suffi-
cient reason on the strength of the fact that to negate it means to negate the principle of identity. 
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children have abounding vitality, because they are in spirit fierce and free, 
therefore they want things repeated and unchanged. They always say, “Do it 
again” […]. It is possible that God says every morning, “Do it again” to the 
sun; and every evening, “Do it again” to the moon. It may not be automatic ne-
cessity that makes all daisies alike; it may be that God makes every daisy sepa-
rately, but has never got tired of making them. It may be that He has the eternal 
appetite of infancy; for we have sinned and grown old, and our Father is 
younger than we. The repetition in Nature may not be a mere recurrence; it 
may be a theatrical encore. (CHESTERTON 2012, 37). 
I have just said the procedure is going to be quite risky, though it is per-
haps not the best way to phrase it; for it is not the procedure in which the 
risk lies — but the quote; it comes from the chapter “The Ethics of Elfland,” 
perhaps the most important part of the book, one very much appreciated (in-
cluded, for example, in the book Great Essays in Science in 1957 (JAKI 2001, 
14), but also very much misunderstood as to its philosophical value (ibid. 12), 
and so typically Chestertonian that in itself extremely prone to — in the case 
of certain temperaments — reactions of spontaneous repulsion and ridicule. 
One of the best examples (one explaining everything) of such a case is pro-
vided by Hugh Kenner in his admirable piece of critical work, Paradox in 
Chesterton (1947; “admirable” not at all meaning “perfect” or “complete” — 
but definitely pioneering), where he records the surprising hostility with 
which Maurice Evans treated Chesterton’s playful discourse on the American 
spirit and denounced it as a piece of merely illogical verbalism, based on tak-
ing metaphors (or other stylistic tropes) literally (characteristically, Kenner 
does not waste too many words on such diagnoses, but decidedly — and at the 
same time delicately — proceeds to the essence of such criticisms: “Mr. Evans 
does not realize that he has been told a parable”) (KENNER 1947, 111). Now, if 
we follow Kenner’s advice, and for a moment suspend our judgment of the 
Chestertonian form and style (which to me, by the way of parenthesis, seems 
quite inspiring) to proceed directly to the metaphysical insights contained in 
his works (focus not on Chesterton’s “writing” but Chesterton’s “seeing”) 
(ibid., 103) we shall notice that what Chesterton really tries to communicate 
is the fact that the unceasing activity and order of the world requires God as 
its sufficient reason; that it is not explicable by itself alone, and therefore 
points the Transcendence, the Reason of all reason, the fullness of intelligi-
bility. “The sun rises every morning. I do not rise every morning; but the 
variation is due not to my activity, but to my inaction” — obviously, this is a 
joke, but a joke communicating a very important metaphysical truth; the 
truth that the world — as it is — does not explain itself. Of course, Chester-
“THERE IS AN ‘IS’”: G. K. CHESTERTON’S INTUITION OF BEING  111
ton speaks predominantly in a hypothetical manner; “it is possible that God 
says every morning, ‘Do it again’”; “it may not be automatic necessity that 
makes all daisies alike”; but it is for rhetorical purposes only. The idea, like 
in the case of his verbal paradoxes, for instance, though in a different way, is 
to stir the mind of the reader, to “overcome mental laziness” (ibid., 56), to 
make him admit the possibility, the general logical validity of the judgment 
— and through this, hopefully, help to kindle in him a spark of metaphysical 
meditation necessary to attain the primary truths about the world. 
So much about the principle of sufficient reason; let us now proceed thus 
to the principle of finality, one Maritain seems to have treated with special 
attention (in his Preface, at least in the edition used here, the analysis of the 
principle of finality covers 27 pages, and has a whole chapter devoted solely 
to itself — a luxury that no other of the first principles was endowed with). 
Why so long? Obviously, it is quite difficult to guess the motives of the 
author, but the probable cause of that seems to be (quite paradoxically) a 
simple fact that it is the most obvious element of this intuition, and one clos-
est to the world of empiria. As Gilson observes in one of his books: wherev-
er is the tiniest spark of philosophical reflection, the idea of finality is also 
present (GILSON 2009, 156–157).12 “It can most truly be said that the bird 
flies because it possesses wings, because it is a bird. But what then is it to be 
a bird? It is to be determined to fly” (MARITAIN 1943, 119) writes Maritain in 
his Preface…, and the striking simplicity of this phrase is enough to shock 
the mind for a day. Finality is the question of the most conspicuous relations 
in things that immediately strike not only the intellect — but almost rather 
the eyes; in order to “observe” finality it is enough too look out the window. 
Now, how is it with Chesterton? Again, let us examine but one quote from 
The Everlasting Man (1925) and commentary shall become almost totally 
superfluous. 
Looking around him by this unique light, as lonely as the literal flame that be 
alone has kindled, this demigod or demon of the visible world makes that 
world visible. He sees around him a world of a certain style or type. It seems to 
proceed by certain rules or at least repetitions. He sees a green architecture that 
builds itself without visible hands; but which builds itself into a very exact 
plan or pattern, like a design already drawn in the air by an invisible finger. It 
is not, as is now vaguely suggested, a vague thing. It is not a growth or a grop-
                        
12 Obviously, Gilson does not phrase it exactly like that, but he clearly demonstrates that it 
takes a great effort to deny the principle of finality, and that those who deny it usually end up 
denying the reality of certain natural facts. 
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ing of blind life. Each seeks an end; a glorious and radiant end, even for every 
daisy or dandelion we see in ‘looking across the level of a common field. In the 
very shape of things there is more than green growth; there is the finality of the 
flower. It is a world of crowns. (CHESTERTON 2010, 174). 
Essentially, all the elements of the original, primordial even we might 
say, intuition of finality (interwoven in the intuition of being and constitut-
ing merely its natural unfolding) are captured here. Intuition of finality is an 
intellectual intuition, a “spark” of the “unique flame” burning in the souls of 
men (that is, precisely: intellect, reason), piercing through the curtain of sen-
sible phenomena and attaining essences, the intelligible pattern of things, 
a “style or type” of the world — and yet, it is also very simple, immediate, 
intimately connected with sense-perception, a direct intellectual reflection 
forcing itself upon the mind after it comes into contact with very basic natu-
ral facts (is it not telling, besides everything else, that Chesterton — while 
speaking about the uniqueness of human intellect and trying to find an ap-
propriate example of its workings — chose, naturally, almost automatically 
— precisely this?). It perceives that every existing object is ordained, by its 
very nature, to a certain end, which is the fullest possible flowering of its be-
ing (“finality of the flower,” “a glorious and radiant end,” “a world of 
crowns” — a world seeking completion in the final natural perfection of be-
ings that constitute it) — and yet, it also grasps the internal, inherent dyna-
mism of this ordination, the fact that it is no mechanical repetition, no pas-
sive transmission of movement from one dead piece of extension to another, 
but an effect of the own, ontic energy of things, of “green architecture” that 
“builds itself with invisible hands,” that is — in its very essence and exist-
ence — equipped with a certain quantum of energy that serves as the princi-
ple of this movement towards supreme actuality (hence the metaphors of 
“radiance” and “glory,” in themselves grounded in the theme of energy and 
light)13; and is it possible not to associate such a notion with the concept of 
the radical love Maritain writes about? 
By her way of parenthesis, just to end things with opening rather than 
a closure, it is interesting to note that by keeping fidelity to the original sim-
plicity of this intuition, Chesterton manages to “translate” it in the existen-
tial terms; for there is also another aspect of the principle of finality, one 
                        
13 Cf. MARITAIN 1965, 57. Maritain also connects the proper understanding of the fifth proof 
of the existence of God, by final causes, with overthrowing Descarte’s mechanicism and adopting 
the view of the world as the “republic of natures,” each of which is the principle and center of its 
proper activity. 
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omitted in the foregoing analysis — the question of the ordination of the 
lower orders of beings to the higher orders of being. It is a rather complex 
idea and it would be unwise to enter into this domain in any other manner 
than by the way of simple mentioning. In Preface… Maritain deals with this 
question by writing: 
[God] does not first will man, then physical world for man’s sake. Nor does He 
first will the acts of seeing, being aware, or moving, and then the animal for 
their sake. Nor does He first will His goodness and its communication, then 
creatures for its sake. He will the physical world should exist for man, that the 
animal world should exist for the acts of seeing, being aware and the like. And 
he wills that creatures should exist for His goodness and its communication. 
Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc; sed non propter hoc vult hoc. He wills the for-
mer should exist for the sake of the latter, but not for the sake of the latter does 
he will the former. (MARITAIN 1943, 122). 
Now, the principal meaning of this passage seems to refer to the question 
of the intrinsic value of things — and to warn any potential (or actual) meta-
physician not to make the ontological good of any creature hang by the thin 
thread of its subordination to other orders of being (in other words: to recog-
nize that every creature is, as such, good). But what chiefly interest us here 
is the fact that this teleological subordination of beings is of radically exis-
tential nature (so is not inscribed in the essence of things, but proceeds from 
the character of real relations of the real world). God wills that the physical 
world “should exist” for the sake of man, that the animal order “should ex-
ist” for the sake of its actions etc. Does not Chesterton formulate it in a 
strikingly similar way? He does not say a lot, but when he says something, 
he definitely tries to explain the man-world relationships in the terms of ex-
istence. God “built up the hills and woods for their coming and had kindled 
the sunrise against their rising, as a servant kindles a fire.” In other words: 
he wished that the hills and woods and the sun should exist for their sake. 
How much is here any real connection and how much a mere coinci-
dence? It is a question for another time. 
Anyhow, in this case, one might reckon, Chesterton — not like himself at 
all — speaks almost plainly; and the teleological aspect of his thinking is 
simply undeniable. Just like any other realist element of it (by the way of pa-
renthesis). The conclusion forces itself on the mind and should not be unnat-
urally suppressed, let us voice it then: Gilbert Keith Chesterton had the true 
and lively intuition of being. 
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However, the question does not end here; for if the reader followed the cited 
Chesterton’s passages, he most surely noticed at least one thing; that Chester-
ton never speaks metaphysically. That his expression lacks something. That he 
never spoke in a way proper to the elevated subject in question. Why is that? 
The answer is simple; and it has already been given in the first paragraphs of 
this paper. Chesterton, although he possessed a tremendously intensive intui-
tion of being, never cared to develop the metaphysical habitus to a grade cor-
responding to this intensity; in other words: he left his metaphysical habitus 
“be,” was content to possess it in an embryonic form — and never allowed 
this embryo to, never wanted it to, become a fully developed organism. 
He seldom used scholastic vocabulary, and if ever — he did with great cau-
tion, and (like in his last book published during his lifetime, The Well and the 
Shallows) almost timidly, never — moreover — with connection to the proper 
object it was invented to explain and signify (CHESTERTON 2006, 30–31). 
Chesterton’s language, as Stanley Jaki relates (not without anger) was often 
the cause of disregard and neglection (William Auden, a great admirer of 
Chesterton’s work, for example, never managed to realize the metaphysical 
value of Orthodoxy and writes that in his “The Ethics of Elfland” Chesterton 
was most enjoyable because “at his silliest” (JAKI 2001, 12)); on the other 
hand, Stanley Jaki himself (among others) would always, as it was already 
demonstrated, accentuate the high philosophical quality of Chesterton’s her-
itage, and praise his deep understanding of metaphysical realism. How could 
two intelligent and well-educated critics differ so much in so fundamental a 
case? Now, this discrepancy (being also a justification of the unjustifiable 
generalization from the beginning of this paper) can be easily explained: it 
results precisely from the fact that Chesterton, although he must have pos-
sessed the metaphysical habitus alongside with the intuition as such, never 
decided to make use of it properly speaking — and thus his literature, though 
exhibiting a deep understanding of the metaphysical matter, exhibits it only 
indirectly and through the distant influence on other “habituses,” especially 
this that is responsible for journalist writing (WĄS 2016, 120–121). Discov-
ering the metaphysical profundity of his views requires certain effort and 
knowledge; and often so it happens that we are capable of thanking Chester-
ton for what he did years later — when we are able to pierce through the 
layer of their formal organization, and consciously grasp their intellectual 
essence that was communicated to us obscurely even during the first reading. 
We did not know it at the moment — but it worked. 
That is the final touch upon the thesis of this text. 
“THERE IS AN ‘IS’”: G. K. CHESTERTON’S INTUITION OF BEING  115
What does it change? Does this rather extensive analysis is in any way 
beneficial for the Chestertonian studies, or for humanities in general? 
Hopefully, at least certain possibilities of such a positive influence can be 
discovered here. Firstly, then, this approach makes it possible to solve cer-
tain problems of what might be called the “main tradition” of Chestertonian 
criticism while keeping closely to its essential elements. Many Chestertonian 
critics, as it was summarized in an earlier work, refered to Chesterton’s met-
aphysical insights by using certain better or worse metaphors; they would 
talk about Chesterton “seeing” the universe in the same way as Aquinas did, 
about intellectual “sympathy” or other things of that type — yet they would 
never explain clearly what they had in mind, rendering their analyzes at least 
rather suspicious to the neutral reader (ibid., 38–39). Now, this line of 
thought can find its explanation — and a form more satisfactory to more in-
quisitive minds. Chesterton possessed intuition of being and clearly under-
stood the object it communicated — but for some reason (ultimately known 
only to himself) he chose to speak and think about it without developing the 
intellectual instrumentarium most suited to its exigencies. Thus at the same 
time he was a philosopher and was not a philosopher — depending on what 
meaning we decide to ascribe to the term. 
Secondly, it can turn the attention of the critics to certain particular ele-
ments of Chesterton’s style and form. As it was said, Chesterton’s writings 
work; they try to communicate the intuition of being as much as it is possible 
— their main aim being, at least in the fragments devoted to the subject, like 
in the cited passage from Orthodoxy, to “prepare” the reader for achieving 
this intuition, to create in him a spiritual “space” wherein being as such, the 
most profound ontological mystery of reality, could reveal itself. It is a diffi-
cult matter, no doubt — but it might be supposed that examining Chester-
ton’s formal devices from this perspective might shed on them some fresh 
light, and place them in a new context, one allowing for a fruitful and fasci-
nating research. 
Thirdly — it can contribute much to understanding Chesterton’s political 
views. It is a rather complex topic, and it is better not to go too deep into it 
at the end of this already too long text, but it might be suspected that exam-
ining distributism, with all its personalist elements (ibid., 69–72), in the 
light of this metaphysical foundation may create an interesting, new perspec-
tive — and who knows what thrilling discoveries await the researchers at the 
end of the road? Chesterton was a fascinating political thinker (in fact he dealt 
with politics much better, technically, than with metaphysics — and this habi-
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tus was in him certainly fiery and burning bright) — but his political thought 
would have been nothing without the intuition of being that allowed him to 
grasp the truth about human personality, and indirectly — yet very visibly — 
transfigured all the political notions (such as of the general will) that he inher-
ited from other traditions of thought, rendering him a unique political philoso-
pher, most suited to the complex and difficult demands of the present day. 
Lastly, this analyzes proves something not about Chesterton, but about 
someone else (and may I be allowed to say that it is, for me, a source of spe-
cial joy and pleasure); about Jacques Maritain, the writings of whom served 
here as the methodological basis. Well, hopefully this whole procedure 
proved that they actually can serve as the basis for such analysis — and with 
good results. If so — what could probably serve as a reason for not using 
them in the analysis of some other piece of literature? Are they suited to ex-
amine one writer — and one writer only? Maritain was a brilliant mind; a 
complete thinker, able to equip the contemporary humanities with the back-
ground necessary for dynamic unity and systematic reconstruction. Why 
should it be neglected? Why cannot we have not only the Maritainian philo-
sophical analysis, but also Maritainan theory of culture or Maritainian phi-
lology? The possibilities are simply uncountable, all the roads open — and 
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„JEST JAKIEŚ ‘JEST’”: INTUICJA BYTU 
W MYŚLI I PISARSTWIE GILBERTA KEITHA CHESTERTONA 
(PERSPEKTYWA MARITAINOWSKA) 
S t r e s z c z e n i e  
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że Gilbert Keith Chesterton miał prawdziwą intuicję bytu, taką 
jak zdefiniował ją tomista francuski, Jacques Maritain, niemniej niemalże bez towarzyszącego jej 
metafizycznego habitusu. Tekst rozpoczyna wyjaśnienie używanych pojęć i krótki wykład teorii 
intuicji bytu. Następnie następuje próba dowiedzenia przyjętej tezy na podstawie materiału do-
wodowego dotyczącego trzech zasadniczych skutków rzeczonej intuicji: jej właściwego przed-
miotu (do którego „funkcjonalnie” należy włączyć także zasadę tożsamości), zasady racji dosta-
tecznej i zasady celowości. Następnie dowodzi się, że choć Gilbert Keith Chesterton wykazywał 
wysoki poziom zrozumienia powyższych zagadnień, nigdy nie mówił o nich w sposób ściśle me-
tafizyczny — co wskazuje dokładnie na brak odpowiedniej dyspozycji umysłowej — z jedno-
czesną próbą zarysowania skutków tego stanu rzeczy. Tekst wieńczy garść praktycznych kon-
kluzji, jakie można z niniejszych rozważań wyprowadzić. 
 
 
“THERE IS AN ‘IS’”: INTUITION OF BEING 
IN THE THOUGHT AND WRITINGS OF GILBERT KEITH CHESTERTON 
(A MARITAINIAN PERSPECTIVE) 
S u m m a r y  
The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Gilbert Keith Chesterton possessed the genuine 
intuition of being as defined by the French Thomist, Jacques Maritain, albeit almost without the 
proper metaphysical habitus. It opens with some explanations of the terms used, and with a short 
extrapolation of the theory of the intuition of being. Next it proceeds to proving the thesis as-
sumed by the means of demonstrating that Chesterton exhibited the intuition of being as to three 
most important elements: its proper object (with the principle of identity included), the principle 
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of sufficient reason and the principle of finality. Next it attempts to demonstrate that despite that 
understanding, he never spoke in a properly metaphysical manner, the fact that points to the lack 
of metaphysical habitus, and to establish certain consequences of this state of things. The text 
ends with a list of practical conclusions that could be drawn from an analysis such as this. 
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